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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This case proceeded to a Jury Trial on January 11,2013; at which time he was convicted 
by a jury of Driving Under the Influence. (1/11/2013 Tr., p.127, Ls.13-16). Mr. Rocha filed 
his Notice of Appeal on February 27, 2013; the District Court heard argument and took the 
matter under advisement. The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order 
affirming the conviction on October 2,2013 and Mr. Rocha now timely appeals. 
On appeal, Mr. Rocha asserts the following: 1) that the trial court erred in admitting 
irrelevant evidence over Defendant's objection; 2) that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
when: it placed before the jury facts not in evidence, and it improperly shifted the burden of 
proof; and 3) that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Alfredo Rocha was driving or in actual physical control while under the influence of an 
intoxicating substance. 
Statement of the Facts 
Alfredo Rocha was sleeping in his disable vehicle, with the hood open and resting 
against the windshield, when Officer Shannon Taylor of the Boise City Police Department 
approached his vehicle on September 1, 2012 at approximately 4:45 a.m. (1/11/13 Tr. p.22, 
Ls.16-23 )(1/11/13 Tr. p.56, Ls.8-10). The officer observed the vehicle for ten to fifteen minutes 
before approaching the vehicle. (1/11/13 Tr. p.53, LsA-7). There were two individuals in the 
vehicle, both of them we're laying back with their heads against the headrest. (1/11/13 Tr. p.23, 
Ls.16-23). The officer called for an assist and waited another 10 minutes for the assist to arrive. 
(1/11/13 Tr. p.23, L.22 - p.24, L.l). The officer then approached the vehicle and proceeded to 
wake up the sleeping driver. (1111/13 Tr. p.24, Ls.6-11). The officer is unaware as to how long 
Mr. Rocha had been sleeping on the side of the road. (1/11/13 Tr. p.55, Ls.17-22).The officer 
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observed Mr. Rocha's hands in his lap, palms up with a cell phone in his right hand. (1/11/13 Tr. 
p.53, Ls.12-15). 
The officer observed an odor of an alcoholic beverage, slow and deliberate speech, and 
bloodshot and glassy eyes. (1/11/13 Tr. p.24, Ls.21-25). Mr. Rocha admitted to the officer that 
he had been drinking at around 7:30 p.m., which was not recorded by the officer in her report. 
(1/11/13 Tr. p.54, Ls.2-13). Mr. Rocha further advised the officer that another vehicle had come 
by to help at around 2:45 or 3:45 but was not sure as to the exact time. (1/11/13 Tr. p.55, Ls.22-
p.56, Ls.7). The officer admitted that there is potentially two (2) hours that Mr. Rocha could 
potentially have been parked on the side of the road. (1/11/13 Tr. p.56, Ls.1-14). The officer 
was concerned because she believed he had been driving, but the vehicle was not running. 
(1111/13 Tr. p.25, Ls.7-13). Based on the officer's observations she asked the defendant to 
perform Field Sobriety Tests; Mr. Rocha did not pass any of the administered tests. (1/11/13 Tr. 
p.39, Ls.18-21). Mr. Rocha was then placed under arrest for DUI. (1111/13 Tr. p.40, Ls.l-2). 
The officer advised Mr. Rocha of the Administrative License Suspension waited the 
required 15 minute period at which time Mr. Rocha refused to provide a breath sample. (1/11113 
Tr. pA7, Ls.18-25). Mr. Rocha advised the officer that he understood the consequences of not 
providing a breath sample. (1111/13 Tr. pA8, Ls.3-6). The officer admitted that she is familiar 
with Idaho Code § 18-8002 and that she is required by law to take one or more evidentiary test to 
determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances. 
(1111/13 Tr. p.79, Ls.6-19)., The officer testified that it is not the policy of the Meridian Police 
Department to force a blood draw or take a urine sample. (1/11/13 Tr. p.48, Ls.16-20). 
However the officer admitted that based on the statute and current case law she is aware that she 
could use force to obtain an evidentiary sample. (1/11/13 Tr. p.79, Ls.21 - p.80, Ls.6). 
2 
ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err in admitting irrelevant evidence over defendant's objections? 
II. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when it placed before the jury facts not in 
evidence; and improperly shifted the burden of proof? 
III. Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Alfredo Rocha 
was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of an intoxicating substance? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Trial Court Erred In Admitting the Administrative License Suspension Advisory Form Over 
the Defendant's Objection Because It Was Not Relevant To Any Element Of The Crime. 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Rocha asserts that the trial court erred by failing to sustain objections to irrelevant 
evidence specifically admitting the Administrative License Suspension Advisory Form which 
was admitted as State's Exhibit 3. 
B. Standard of Review 
When reviewing a trial court's evidentiary rulings, including those made over objections, 
the Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564, 165 P.3d 
273,278 (2007). When determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court must 
ascertain: (1) "whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;" (2) 
"whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it;" and (3) "whether the court 
reached its conclusion by an exercise of reason." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 
918,923 (2010). 
C. The Trial Court Erred When It Admitted The Administrative License Suspension Form 
As State's Exhibit 3. 
If evidence is not relevant, it should not be admitted. If irrelevant evidence is admitted, 
then the focus on appeal should be whether or not such error prejudiced the objecting party." 
State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 70, 44 P.3d 1122 (2002). A judgment may not be disturbed on 
appeal due to error in an evidentiary ruling unless the error affected the substantial rights of a 
party. White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 891, 104 P.3d 356, 365 (2004). 
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Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." LR.E. 401; State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 597, 603, 977 P.2d 211, 217 
(Ct.App.1998). Whether evidence is relevant is an issue oflaw. 
Evidence, although relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. LR.E. 403. The trial court's conclusions of whether 
the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice 
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 219, 16 P.3d 
890, 895 (2000). 
Mr. Rocha contends that the trial court erred when it failed to sustain objections to the 
admission of State's Exhibit 3 the Administrative License Suspension Advisory From. While it 
is proper for the State to utilize the arrestee's refusal of the BAC test as evidence at trial it was 
improper for the trial court to admit the Administrative License Suspension Advisory Form as 
State's Exhibit 3 because it improperly references penalty or punishment. State v. Green, 149 
Idaho 706, 711,239 P.3d 811, 816 (Ct.App.201O) 
Prior to the presentation of evidence, the Court instructed the jurors as follows: 
"your duties are to determine the facts and to apply the law set forth in my 
instructions to those facts and in this way decide the case. . .. You must consider 
the instructions as a whole, not picking out some and disregarding others." 
(1111111 Tr., p.4, Ls.1-9). The Court further instructed the jury to: 
"not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That 
subject must not in any way affect your deliberation or your verdict in this case. 
If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty to determine what the 
appropriate penalty or punishment should be." 
(1/11/13 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-8). 
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The admission of this evidence is harmful and was used during closing argument by the 
prosecutor to appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury. During closing argument the 
prosecutor used State's Exhibit 3 as follows: 
"why didn't he blow? When you go back into chambers to deliberate, you 
will be given State's Exhibit *-003. This is the notification of suspension. This is 
the administrative license suspension. The ALS. This document is given to the 
suspect, to the defendant, for them to read. It is also played out loud through an 
audio speaker so they can also hear if they choose not to read. 
The reason it's given to them twice like that is because it is serious. What 
this form tells a suspect is that if they refuse to participate in a breath test or blood 
test or whatever happens to be, in this case it is the breath test. If they refuse that 
breath test, there are penalties and those penalties are significant. The person is 
fined. 
The second, real problem, one year absolute driver's license suspension. 
That means no driving to work. That means no driving to school. That means no 
driving for a year. When you are put in that position of giving a breath sample, 
do I give this sample and let them know what my breath alcohol is, or do I refuse 
and accept these consequences. That's what the defendant did. He did not want 
to reveal his breath alcohol. 
The defendant shows [ chose] to take those penalties rather than let you 
know what his alcohol concentration was. Why not blow and let us know? 
What's going on up there that he didn't want to let us know? 
... he is not under the influence he should be clear enough to recognize I 
should just take this test and maybe I will walk out of here. That's the logical 
logic. Take the test. You are under. You get out of here. The reason you don't 
blow is because you know you are going to be over. Because you know you had 
too much to drink because you passed out in your car on the side of the road. 
That's why you don't blow." 
(1111/13 Tr. p.94, L.l - p.96, L.3) 
Even if the evidence admitted is relevant, the value of the challenged evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the probative effect of the evidence. Furthermore, the admission of 
this evidence cannot be seen as harmless error. In order for the evidence to be relevant it "must 
be sufficiently established as fact and relevant as a matter of law to a material element of the 
charged offense. State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 688, 273 P.3d 1271, 1281 (2012). The state 
argued that the Administrative License Suspension Advisory Form was "relevant to make sure 
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that the fact that the defendant was fully advised of what the ALS is and the consequences of the 
breath test are - he was made aware of that." (1/11/13 Tr., p.45, Ls.4-8). Mr. Rocha contends 
that his knowledge of an Administrative procedure has no relevance to whether he was driving 
under the influence. The State cannot and did not point to an element for which that piece of 
evidence was being used to prove. The State further improperly used that evidence to suggest or 
imply consciousness of guilt. 
Because the evidence is not relevant to a permitted purpose, it is next necessary to 
determine whether its admission was harmless. In applying the harmless error test articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See also State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010). "To hold the errors are harmless, the Court "must 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without the 
admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 113, 106 P.3d 436, 439 
(2005). 
The District Court made a blanket statement that it is not error for the jury to be informed 
of the circumstances of the defendant's refusal to submit to evidentiary testing. (R., p.166.) Mr. 
Rocha agrees with that statement; however that was not the issue on appeal. The issue is 
whether the admission of the Administrative License Suspension Advisory Form was error and 
whether that admission was harmless. The circumstances of the refusal would be relevant, but 
not any other information with regard to an administrative penalty or punishment. The District 
Court in part seemed to rely on the fact that the Administrative License Suspension form does 
not reference "penalties or punishment" for driving under the influence but rather the available 
sanctions for refusing to submit to evidentiary testing. (R., p.162.) This seems like an absurd 
distinction, specifically because of the instructions the jury is given with regard to penalty or 
7 
punishment. Although we have considerable faith injuries, we cannot expect them to discern the 
difference between an administrative vs. criminal penalty especially when those administrative 
penalties are being admitted in a criminal trial to prove guilt. Further it is a likely inference that 
the jury could have thought the defendant was guilty, but also believed that the State didn't 
prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, but then considered the penalties the defendant had been 
subjected to and decided that maybe it wasn't enough and they wanted the defendant to be 
punished further. 
The defendant must establish an error; the burden then lies with the State to demonstrate 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case the error cannot be said to be 
"surely unattributable to the error." While there is some evidence on which the jury could have 
based its verdict, including odor of alcohol, slow and deliberate speech, glassy and blood shot 
eyes, and the failure of evidentiary testing; there is no specific evidence that Mr. Rocha was 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while his breath alcohol was above a .08 
or while he was under the influence of an intoxicating substance. This evidence was used to 
improperly argue to the jury consciousness of guilt and the State cannot show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that this evidence did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Therefore, because 
the error affected Mr. Rocha's right to a fair trial the judgment of conviction must be vacated and 
remanded to the magistrate court for a new trail. 
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ARGUMENT 
II. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He 1) Placed Before The Jury Facts Not In 
Evidence; and 2) Improperly Shifted The Burden Of Proof. 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Rocha asserts that the prosecutor violated his right to a fair trial and denial of his due 
process rights when the prosecutor placed before the jury facts not in evidence and improperly 
shifted the burden of proof. 
1. The prosecutor committed misconduct when he placed before the jury facts not in 
evidence. 
a. Standard of Review 
In State v Field the Supreme Court of Idaho held that the standard of review for claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct when there has been a contemporaneous objection is as follows: 1) the 
Court must determine factually if there was prosecutorial misconduct, 2) then the court must 
determine whether the error was harmless. 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007). The burden rests on the 
State to prove that the error was not harmless. Id. 
Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of 
fact in a criminal case. State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 18, 189 P.3d 477,480 (Ct.App.2008). Its 
purpose is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence. !d. 
It is plainly improper for a party to present closing argument that misrepresents or 
mischaracterizes the evidence. State v. Felder, 150 Idaho 269, 274, 245 P.3d 1021, 1026 
(Ct.App. 2010). In addition, it constitutes misconduct for a prosecutor to place before the jury 
facts not in evidence. Id. Furthermore, appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury 
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through use of inflammatory tactics are improper. State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 89, 898, 792 P.2d 
916,923 (1990). 
The role of the prosecutor is to present the government's case earnestly and vigorously, 
using every legitimate means to bring about a conviction, but also to see that justice is done and 
that every criminal defendant is afforded a fair trial. State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942, 877 P.2d 
905, 913 (1994). Although the Court has recognized the imposition of certain well-accepted 
restrictions beyond which the prosecutor's argument may not go without running afoul of its 
function, the propriety of a given argument will depend largely on the facts of each case. Darden 
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). The function of appellate 
review is not to discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct 
did not interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial. State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 
816 P.2d 1002, 1008(Ct.App.1991); see also State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 640-41, 637 P.2d 
415,417-18 (1981). 
During the State's rebuttal the following colloquy took place: 
"Defense counsel suggests that the state - or sorry, that the Meridian 
Police Department should forcibly subject you to a test because State code allows 
that. I can tell you in my experience as a prosecutor I am aware that other 
jurisdictions do in fact force you to do a blood draw if you refuse a breath test. 
Now the simple fact that Meridian and their City Council and their police 
department has chosen not to go that route, has chosen not to force people to do a 
blood draw, well, I think that says something about City Council Meridian police 
department. The fact that they are legally allowed to do that is one thing. The 
fact that they choose not to force someone into that shouldn't be held against 
them. 
There is any number of reasons why the City of Meridian has chosen not 
to go that route. Obviously cause some kind of liability. So some jurisdictions 
are -" 
Defense Counsel: Objection, Judge. Facts not in evidence. 
The Court: I will overrule the objection. 
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"Some jurisdictions don't want to take that risk. They don't want to go 
down that road." 
(1/11/13 Tr., p.l22, L.25 - p.123, L.24). Furthermore during deliberations the jury sent a 
question to the judge which read as follows "when did Meridian City start the change on blood 
draws after refusal to take breathalyzer and since the change have they requested any blood 
draws." 
In State v. McClain, 154 Idaho 742, 302 P.3d 367 (Ct.App.2012) the Court of Appeals 
was asked to look at the issue of the persistent violator enhancement. In that case: 
"during deliberations, the jury sent three separate notes to the court 
pertaining to the lack of evidence identifying third degree assault as a felony 
under Oregon law. The court directed the jury to continue deliberations, and the 
jury ultimately found that McClain had been convicted of felony assault in 
Oregon. When McClain later filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
persistent violator enhancement, the district court denied the motion. 
McClain asserts that on this record it is apparent that there was insufficient 
evidence to establish that the Oregon conviction was for a felony. We agree." 
Id. at 748. The Court held that the record plainly did not indicate whether a third degree assault 
was a felony, and no other evidence in the record answered that question. The Court further 
indicated that the State did not introduce copies of the applicable Oregon statutes that could have 
identified the offense as a misdemeanor or as a felony. 
The District Court held that the "prosecutor's remark ... is not a statement of fact. 
Instead, it is merely the prosecutor's inference or opinion. (R., p.l69.) However this assertion is 
error. Had the prosecutor argued in his closing that "there are numerous reasons a city might not 
want to force blood draws anyone of which could be policy, financial, training, all of these 
things." we would not be arguing this issue. That is not the case, the prosecutor, did not make an 
inference, the prosecutor made a statement. It wasn't made as a suggestion or as inference; it 
was stated as a fact. 
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Mr. Rocha asserts that the trial courts failure to sustain the objection to facts not in 
evidence and to strike the argument by the prosecutor, or in the least to instruct the jury that the 
prosecutor's statements are not evidence is not harmless. Mr. Rocha has made a showing that 
the state improperly placed facts before the jury and it is the state's burden to show that the error 
was harmless. As is similar to McClain, based on the questions from the jury regarding the 
Meridian city policy regarding blood draws it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
jury would have reached the same result without the admission of the challenged argument 
therefore the state cannot meet its burden. 
2. The prosecutor committed misconduct when he improperly shifted the burden of 
proof. 
a. Standard of Review 
Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, Idaho appellate courts may 
only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the violation in question qualifies as 
fundamental error. State v. Perry 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. The fundamental error 
analysis includes a three prong test wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading the 
appellate court that the: 
Id. 
"alleged error (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. If 
the defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error satisfies 
this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and remand." 
While our system of justice is adversarial in nature and the prosecutor is expected to be 
diligent and leave no stone untumed, he is never the less expected and required to be fair. Field, 
144 Idaho at 571. In Field, the Supreme Court also identified the standard of review for claims 
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of prosecutorial misconduct when there is no contemporaneous objection. Id. A conviction will 
be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only if the conduct is sufficiently egregious so as to 
result in fundamental error. Id. "Misconduct will be regarded as fundamental error when it 
"goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or '" to the foundation of the case or 
take[ s] from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or 
out to permit him to waive." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 716, 215 P.3d 414,436 (2009). 
"However, even when prosecutorial misconduct has resulted in fundamental error, the conviction 
will not be reversed when that error is harmless. Field, 144 Idaho at 571. Under the harmless 
error doctrine, a conviction will stand if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the same result would have been reached by the jury had the prosecutorial misconduct 
not occurred. Id. 
Misconduct may occur by the prosecutor diminishing or distorting the State's burden to 
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Felder, 150 Idaho at 274. The 
requirement that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded 
in the constitutional guarantee of due process. Id. The Court in Felder further held that "this 
standard of proof plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure because it 
provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence-the bedrock axiomatic and 
elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our 
criminal law. Id. citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,363,90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, (1970). 
The prosecutor has the right to identify how, from the prosecutor's perspective, the 
evidence confirms or calls into doubt the credibility of a particular witness. However in this case 
the prosecutor's remarks were as follows: 
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"When you are put in that position of giving a breath sample, do I give this 
sample and let them know what my breath alcohol is, or do I refuse and accept 
these consequences. That's what the defendant did. He did not want to reveal is 
breath alcohol. 
We as citizens through our legislature and everything that we vote, requires 
every one that drives on our roads to consent to a breath test. Implied consent. 
Maybe you have heard that phrase before. When you get a driver's license it is 
implied consent that you will submit to one of these tests. The penalty for not 
doing that is you lose your license for a year absolutely and pay a significant fine. 
The defendant [chose] to take those penalties rather than let you know what 
his alcohol concentration was. Why not blow and let us know? What's going on 
up there that he didn't want to let us know?" 
"The reason you don't blow is because you know you are going to be over. 
Because you know you had too much to drink because you passed out in your car 
on the side of the road. That's why you don't blow." 
"Now, in this particular case the defendant refused to give a breath sample. 
Why did he refuse? If he wasn't under the influence he should have blown. If he 
didn't feel impaired he should have blown. Consciousness of guilt. That's why 
you don't blow. 
Defense counsel suggests that the state - or sorry, that the Meridian Police 
Department should forcibly subject you to a test because State code allows that. I 
can tell you in my experience as a prosecutor I am aware that other jurisdictions do 
in fact force you to do a blood draw if you refuse the breath test. 
The breath test is the most or the least invasive of all the tests you can do. 
You don't have to stick out your arm. You don't have to have a needle. You don't 
have to pee in a cup. You just simply blow in a tube. It doesn't take very long at 
all. Why not just give that breath test. Didn't want to give up that number. 
(1111/13 Tr., p.94, Ls.22-25 - p.95, Ls.1-17) (1111/13 Tr., p.96, Ls.1-3) (1/11/13 Tr., p.122, 
Ls.18-25 - p.123, Ls.1-5). (1/11/13 Tr., p.124, Ls.1-7) 
In the instant case, the prosecutor did not simply call into question the credibility of a 
particular witness, because in fact Mr. Rocha did not testify. The prosecutor did not simply 
identify how, from his perspective the evidence confirms or calls into doubt the credibility of a 
witness. The prosecutor's statements were all directed at Mr. Rocha's refusal to take an 
evidentiary test, and how that refusal infers consciousness of guilt. As stated in Darden, the 
propriety of any given argument will depend largely on the facts of each case, when looking at 
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the specific facts of this case, it cannot be said that these statements were not fundamental error 
and it cannot be found beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result would have been reached 
by the jury had the prosecutorial misconduct not occurred. 
b. Mr. Rocha's fundamental right to the presumption of innocence was 
violated when the Prosecutor shifted the burden, arguing that Mr. Rocha 
should have proven his innocence by blowing in a breathlyzer maching. 
In Morisette, the jury was instructed that it only had to find that the defendant 
intentionally exercised dominion over certain property, and ignored the "knowingly" element of 
the charge. The United States Supreme Court held that "[T]his presumption would conflict with 
the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which 
extends to every element ofthe crime. Such incriminating presumptions are not to be improvised 
by the judiciary. Even congressional power to facilitate convictions by substituting presumptions 
for proof is not without limit." Morisette v. US, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). This is exactly what the 
State did in this case, and even more specifically made remarks about "consciousness of guilt" 
and "that's why you don't blow." Consciousness of guilt allows or instructs the jury to infer that 
because he refused a breath test he is guilty. 
c. Mr. Rocha's Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination was 
violated when the State commented on his refusal to participate in an 
evidentiary testy because any implied consent authorizing evidentiary 
testing for a motorist suspected of DUI is revocable. 
According to State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007) by obtaining a driver's license, Idaho 
motorists have impliedly consented to involuntary blood draws if law enforcement has 
reasonable suspicion that the motorist is under the influence of an intoxicating substance. 1 Mr. 
1 The McNeely plurality noted that "States have a broad range of legal tools to enforce their drunk-driving 
laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws." Id. 133 
S.Ct. 1552 at 1566. The Court observed that all 50 states have implied consent statutes which "impose 
significant consequences when a motorist withdraws consent." !d. Implicit is this portion of the opinion 
is that a motorist does have the ability to withdraw hislher consent and the implied consent statutes do not 
act as a per se exception to the warrant requirement. 
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Rocha does not dispute that pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002 and Diaz, "In Idaho 'any person who 
drives or is in actual physical control' of a vehicle impliedly consents to evidentiary testing for 
alcohol at the request of a peace officer with reasonable grounds for suspicion of DUI." Diaz, 
144 Idaho at 302. However, even if Mr. Rocha impliedly consented to evidentiary testing, 
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Rocha retained the right to revoke his consent. It is 
without question that a State cannot condition the granting of a privilege upon the renunciation 
of a constitutional right. See Slochowerv. Bd. Of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956) 
(striking down statute which made the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination by a 
city employee or agent relating to his or official duties the functional equivalent of a resignation, 
where statute resulted in conclusive presumption of guilt of one who claimed his or her 
constitutional privilege, such discharge violated due process even though employee had no 
constitutional right to be a City employee). 
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation 
which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights 
guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same 
result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a 
valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not 
necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having 
power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees 
fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one of 
the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the 
relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of 
one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel 
a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution 
of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence. 
Frost v. R.R. Comm 'n of California, 271 U.S. 583,593-594 (1926). 
Moreover, federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have repeatedly 
held that although a suspect can consent to a search of his person or property, that suspect retains 
the right to revoke, withdraw, or delimit his consent at anytime. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 
348 (1991) (holding that a suspect may "delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which 
he consents," in the context of a vehicle search); United States v. McWeeney, 454 F.3d 1030 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (holding that, "a suspect is free ... after initially giving consent, to delimit or 
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withdraw his or her consent at any time," in the context of a stop and risk); United States v. 
Sanders, 424 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Once given, consent to search may be withdrawn."); 
United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 907 (3rd Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a suspect retains the right 
to revoke his consent, in the context of a luggage search); United States v. Marshall, 348 F.3d 
281 (1 st Cir. 2003) (same, in the context of a home search); United States v. Bustillos-Munoz, 235 
F.3d 505 (10th Cir. 2000) (same, in the context of a vehicle search); United States v. McFarley, 
991 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1993) (same, in the context of a luggage search). 
Accordingly, to the extent Mr. Rocha impliedly consented to evidentiary testing by 
operating a motor vehicle on Idaho roads, Mr. Rocha validly and unequivocally revoked his 
consent, when he refused to participate. Thus, if the State wished to prove that Mr. Rocha was 
under the influence of an intoxicating substance, it had the means to do so. The officer could 
have obtained a warrant and had Mr. Rocha's blood drawn. Mr. Rocha had the right to refuse, 
and it would seem that if such a right exists, which is why the Administrative License 
Suspension Advisory is in effect, that when the defendant exercises that right not to submit to the 
test, that right is rendered valueless because the jury can draw an inference of guilt. 
d. Mr. Rocha has met his burden and established that the arguments made by 
the prosecutor in closing arguments are fundamental error. 
Mr. Rocha never waived any aspect of his constitutional rights; including his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, his right to due process of law and his fundamental 
right to the presumption of innocence. In Idaho, a defendant may waive a right of constitutional 
magnitude provided it is shown that he did so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. 
Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 626, 726 P.2d 735, 738 (1986). The record is devoid of any pleading, 
testimony or statement of Mr. Rocha which can be read as a knowing, voluntary and intelligent 
waiver of his constitutional rights. 
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The error is plainly visible in the record without the need for additional information, 
including information as to whether the failure to object was tactical. This is not a situation in 
which Mr. Rocha needs the benefit of additional evidence in order to state and support his 
constitutional challenges to a prosecution, given the record in this case, for a violation of Idaho 
Code § 18-8004. 
This error is clearly not harmless. Mr. Rocha has an absolute constitutional right against 
self-incrimination as provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. This right against self-incrimination 
goes directly to the foundation or basis of Mr. Rocha's rights and cannot be taken away. When 
the prosecutor argued consciousness of guilt it impermissibly shifted the burden to the Defendant 
to prove that he was not under the influence when he has an absolute right to refuse and accept 
the penalty outlined in the Administrative License Suspension Advisory Form. Furthermore 
because State's Exhibit 3 (ALS Form) was admitted and allowed in with the jury during 
deliberations, there is no way this Court can be sure that the same result would have been 
reached had the misconduct and argument about consciousness of guilt not occurred. 
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ARGUMENT 
III. 
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Alfredo Rocha 
Was: 1) Driving or In Actual Physical Control Of A Motor Vehicle; 2) While Under The 
Influence Of An Intoxicating Substance. 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Rocha asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of driving under the 
influence. Specifically, there was no or limited evidence regarding whether he was actually 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicating substance. 
B. There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Alfredo 
Rocha Was Driving Or In Actual Physical Control Of A Motor Vehicle While Under The 
Influence Of An Intoxicating Substance. 
The evidence presented by the State is insufficient to sustain a conviction and there was 
not substantial evidence presented at trial upon which rational triers of fact could find guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. St. v. Barlow, 113 Idaho 573, 746 P.2d 1032 (Ct.App.1987). 
Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if there is substantial evidence upon which a 
rational trier of fact could conclude that the defendant's guilt as to each material element was 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. St. v. Matthews, 124 Idaho 806, 864 P.2d 644 (Ct.App.1993). 
A person is ''under the influence" for purposes of section 18-8004, ifthe person's ability 
to drive is impaired in some identifiable way by alcohol, drugs, intoxicating substances, or some 
combination thereof. The state must prove more than a driving impairment, the state must also 
present evidence, besides the impairment itself, to prove that the impairment was caused by 
alcohol, drugs, or intoxicating substances. The term intoxicated therefore has two components: 
(1) impairment; (2) caused by alcohol or drugs. 
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Lay testimony regarding observations of a person's behavior and actions, including 
FST's can be used to show impairment, one of the necessary elements. However, it is not enough 
for the State to prove that Mr. Rocha was impaired. To establish the elements of a DUI offense, 
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Rocha drove or was in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohoL See I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a). 
(emphasis added) 
An accused's right to demand proof of the State's case beyond a reasonable doubt is of 
"surpassing importance." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). The right to 
demand proof beyond all reasonable doubt is a bedrock constitutional principle. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ("Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt 
standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it is as a requirement of 
due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law 
should be enforced and justice administered.'" (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 
(1968)). "Simply stated, the fact that defendant is 'probably' guilty does not equate with guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Ehlert, 811 N.E.2d 620,631 (TIl. 2004). 
In State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 944 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1997), it was stated that: 
[a]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A 
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on 
appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact 
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt ... [w]e will not substitute our 
view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be 
given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence ... [m]oreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution. 
Id. at 594-595, 944 P.2d at 729-730 (citations omitted). 
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In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 937 P.2d 960 (Ct. App. 1997), it was noted that, 
"[ e ] vidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it 
in detennining whether a disputed point of fact has been proved." Id. at 135, 937 P.2d at 961. 
"The challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not based on a technical or subtle defect. The 
defense simply says that there was not enough admissible evidence to convict the defendant." 
State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877, 908 P.2d 566,570 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Without any evidence regarding whether Mr. Rocha was under the influence of alcohol or 
an intoxicating substance at the time he was driving or in physical control of a motor vehicle 
there is not substantial and competent evidence to support a verdict of guilty. Mr. Rocha 
contends that there was no evidence from which the jury in his case could draw reasonable and 
justifiable inferences of guilt. State v. Ojeda, 119 Idaho 862, 810 P .2d 1148 (Ct.App.1991). 
On appeal, it is clear the Court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the 
jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the testimony and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 718-19, 662 P.2d 
1149, 1162-63 (Ct.App.l983). The Court must review the evidence, and pennissible inferences 
that can be drawn reasonably from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the respondent. 
State v. Slawson, 124 Idaho 753, 757, 864 P.2d 199, 203 (Ct.App.1993). Where there was 
substantial evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered 
upon a jury verdict. Id. 
In this case the evidence which was admitted at trial was that the officer observed a red 
passenger car parked on the east side ofthe road at Locust Grove and Victory. (1/11/13 Tr. p.22, 
Ls.16-23). The hood of the vehicle was up, and leaning against the front windshield of the car. 
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(1111/13 Tr. p.22, Ls.16-23). When the officer stopped her vehicle and approached the suspect 
car she was able to see two men in the vehicle, both had their heads resting against the headrest. 
(1111113 Tr. p.23, Ls.13-23). The officer called for an assist and waited about ten minutes for 
that assist to arrive. (1111113 Tr. p.23, L.21 - p.24 L.1). The officer had to wake up the driver 
who was sleeping in the vehicle, the key was in the ignition but the vehicle was not turned on or 
running. (1111/13 Tr. p.24, L.5 p.25 L.l3). 
The District Court appears to have relied on the above factual evidence which was 
admitted at trial. However, the District Court completely overlooked the requirement that the 
defendant drove or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol. It's not in dispute that Mr. Rocha may have been impaired at the time he was given 
field sobriety testing but !!Q evidence was admitted with regard to the time at which Mr. Rocha 
was driving, nor was any evidence admitted that he was under the influence of alcohol an 
intoxicating substance at the time he was driving. There were no witnesses to his driving, no 911 
calls, no testimony other than his own admission that he had driven to this point at some time in 
the evening, but no evidence as to when. Further, the car was not running and Mr. Rocha was 
not in the driver's position as he was laid back and asleep when approached by law enforcement. 
When the Officer approached the car it was parked. She watched the car for arguably 
twenty-five (25) minutes before making contact with the occupants. She never saw Mr. Rocha 
drive. No one ever saw Mr. Rocha drive and there was no evidence of any driving pattern. The 
vehicle was inoperable, on the side of the road with the hood up leaning against the windshield. 
There was no evidence presented by the State as to how long Mr. Rocha was on the side of the 
road. In fact evidence was admitted that he could possibly have been there for up to 2 hours. No 
rational trier of fact can make a reasonable inference that Mr. Rocha was under the influence at 
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the time he was driving because it would be pure speculation. The State laid a factual basis that 
he may have been impaired at the time the officer made contact, but no leap can be made to any 
time prior to that. 
Consequently, there may be competent and substantial evidence that he was impaired at 
4:30 in the morning, but there was not substantial and competent evidence which would lead a 
reasonable trier of fact to infer that Mr. Rocha was impaired at the time he was driving or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle because no evidence was admitted as to when the Mr. Rocha 
was actually driving. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Rocha respectfully requests that this court vacate his 
judgment of conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal. 
DATED this 20th day of February 2014. \ 
HEIDI TOLMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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